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On December 8, 1999, Nicaragua filed an application with the International Court of Justice requesting that it “determine the course of the single maritime boundary between the areas
of territorial sea, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone appertaining respectively to
Nicaragua and Honduras” in the Caribbean Sea.1 During the proceedings, Nicaragua also
raised the question of sovereignty over several small islands lying within the area of overlapping
maritime claims (para. 127). On October 8, 2007, the Court determined a geography-based,
single maritime boundary to divide the territorial sea, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones of Nicaragua and Honduras (para. 321(2), (3)). The Court also found that Honduras was sovereign over the identifiable islands in dispute: Bobel Cay, Savanna Cay, Port
Royal Cay, and South Cay (para 321(1)).2 Unstable coastal features at the land boundary terminus caused the Court to leave undelimited a short section of the territorial sea boundary. The
Court found that the parties must negotiate the course of this undelimited, near-shore section
of their maritime boundary in good faith (para. 321(4)).
Nicaragua and Honduras are adjacent coastal states that share a land boundary stretching
across the isthmus of Central America from the Gulf of Fonseca in the west to the Caribbean
Sea in the east. The eastern sector of the land boundary follows the thalweg, or deepest channel,
of the River Coco and terminates in the mouth of the River Coco on the delta commonly
referred to as Cape Gracias a Dios. The 1894 Gámez-Bonilla Treaty, which entered into force
in 1896, provided that “each Republic is owner of the territory which at the date of independence constituted respectively, the provinces of Honduras and Nicaragua” (para. 37), and
established a mixed boundary commission to demarcate the boundary.3
In the following decade, after the mixed boundary commission was unable to agree on the
demarcation of the eastern two-thirds of the land boundary, the parties, pursuant to the Treaty,
submitted their dispute over the outstanding portion of the boundary to arbitration by the
King of Spain. The king’s 1906 award placed the land boundary terminus in the thalweg
1
Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. Hond.),
para. 17 (emphasis omitted) (Int’l Ct. Justice Oct. 8, 2007). The basic documents, decisions, pleadings, transcripts,
press releases, and other materials for this case and others are available on the Court’s Web site, ⬍http://www.
icj-cij.org⬎.
With the exception of a short, partial delimitation within the Gulf of Fonseca, the parties’ maritime boundary
in the Pacific remains in dispute; that delimitation was not before the Court.
2
In addition to finding that Honduras was sovereign over Bobel, Savanna, Port Royal, and South Cays, the Court
noted (para. 136) that

[i]n addition to these four main cays, there are a number of smaller islets, cays and reefs in the same area, of
which the physical status (such as whether they are completely submerged below sea level, either permanently
or at high tide), and consequently their legal status (for the purposes of the application of Articles 6, 13 or 121
of [the LOS Convention]) are not clear.
3
This translation of the Treaty appears in Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond.
v. Nicar.), 1960 ICJ REP. 192, 199 (Nov. 18).
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of “the mouth of the River Coco . . . where it flows out in the sea close to Cape Gracias
a Dios”4 (para. 38).
Despite the 1906 arbitral award, territorial disputes over the land boundary continued,
including a dispute over the boundary point at the mouth of the River Coco. In 1958 Honduras instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice requesting the Court to
“adjudge and declare . . . that Nicaragua was under an obligation to give effect to the [1906]
Award” (para. 40). Nicaragua responded, in part, by arguing that the award was “incapable of
execution by reason of its omissions, contradictions and obscurities.”5 Specifically, Nicaragua
“argued that the mouth of a river is not a fixed point and cannot serve as a common boundary
between two States.”6 In 1960, the Court issued its judgment, rejecting Nicaragua’s argument
and confirming that “the thalweg was contemplated in the Award as constituting the boundary
between the two States even at the ‘mouth of the river.’”7 In 1962, a second boundary commission fixed the coordinates of the land boundary terminus in the mouth of the River Coco
at 14° 59.8⬘ N, 83° 08.9⬘ W (1962 Point) (para. 47).
Offshore the mainland coasts of Honduras and Nicaragua, at distances of 30 (nautical) miles
or more from Cape Gracias a Dios, are numerous banks, reefs, and cays. Many of these features—some of which remain above water at low and high tides (islands or rocks, which are
territory), and others which are above water at low tide, but submerged at high tide (low tide
elevations, which are not territory)8 —lie within the disputed maritime area. Although Nicaragua did not mention these features in its application, it claimed them during the proceedings
(paras. 105– 07, 127). This late-coming claim raised the question of admissibility.9 In finding
it admissible (para. 115), the Court observed that this new claim of sovereignty was “implicit
in and arises directly out of the [maritime delimitation] which is the subject-matter of Nicaragua’s Application” (para. 114).10
In order to determine sovereignty over the islands, the Court considered the principle of uti
possidetis juris, the evidentiary value of maps, recognition by third states, and postcolonial effectivités.11 While the Court acknowledged that the principle of uti possidetis juris applied to insular, or island, territory, “nothing [submitted to the Court] clearly indicates whether the islands
4

Quoting id. at 202.
Quoting id. at 199.
6
Id. at 216.
7
Id.
8
See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 ICJ
REP. 40, at 102 (Mar. 16) (reported by Glen Plant at 96 AJIL 198 (2002)).
9
Nicaragua sought to found the Court’s jurisdiction on Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá and the parties’ declarations under Article 36(2) of the Court’s statute (para. 1). Honduras did not contest jurisdiction on either the
territorial or delimitation claims, and the Court did not address the question. Honduras also did not contest the
admissibility of Nicaragua’s island claim (para. 116).
10
The Court also found that the critical date for the purpose of assessing effectivités on the disputed islands was
in 2001, when Nicaragua filed the memorial in which it first “expressly reserved ‘the sovereign rights appurtenant
to all the islets and rocks claimed by Nicaragua in the disputed area’” (para. 129). This late critical date allowed the
Court to consider many Honduran effectivités that would have been irrelevant if it had adopted Nicaragua’s critical
date of 1977.
11
Uti possidetis juris is the principle that the internal administrative boundaries of the pre-independence sovereign, in this case Spain, form the international boundaries of the several successor states, here including Nicaragua
and Honduras. Effectivités are acts that demonstrate the exercise of authority over an area.
5
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were attributed to the colonial provinces of Nicaragua or of Honduras prior to or upon independence” (para. 167). The Court consequently found no sovereignty on the basis of that principle, and it also found that the arguments based on map evidence (paras. 209 –19) and recognition by third states (paras. 220 –26) were unpersuasive. The remaining question was that
of the postcolonial effectivités on the islands.12 While its effectivités were not numerous, Honduras presented evidence that it applied and enforced its criminal and civil law, that it regulated
immigration, and that it carried out public works on the islands—which the Court took as
demonstrating Honduras’s “‘intention and will to act as a sovereign’ and [as] constitut[ing] a
modest but real display of authority over the four islands” (para. 208).13 In the absence of countervailing evidence from Nicaragua, the Court found that Honduras was sovereign over Bobel,
Savanna, Port Royal, and South Cays. The Court then turned to the maritime delimitation.
In the process of delimiting the maritime boundary, the Court encountered two fundamental problems caused by the unstable geomorphology at the mouth of the River Coco: finding
the current location of the land boundary terminus (the theoretical starting point for this
delimitation) and identifying base points for the construction of a provisional equidistance
line. The current location of the River Coco’s mouth was not known. As the Court explained,
“the sediment carried to and deposited at sea by the River Coco [has] caused its delta, as well
as the coastline to the north and south of the Cape, to exhibit a very active morpho-dynamism”
(para. 277). The parties agreed that the mouth had moved eastward from its 1962-era location
(paras. 99 –101), and the Court speculated that this eastward movement was likely to continue
(paras. 277, 307). Moreover, the parties had apparent differences “as to the interpretation and
application of the King of Spain’s 1906 Arbitral Award in respect of sovereignty over the islets
formed near the mouth of the River Coco” (para. 279). The uncertain coastal and political
geography near the land boundary terminus made it “impossible for the Court to identify base
points and construct a provisional equidistance line” (para. 280). The Court solved the problem of the land boundary terminus by leaving undelimited the first three nautical miles of the
boundary as measured from the 1962 Point (para. 311), and it solved the problem of identifying base points for the construction of a provisional equidistance line by adopting a delimitation method other than equidistance. The Court’s delimitation method is discussed after a
review of the parties’ boundary claims.
In their final submissions both parties requested a single maritime boundary formed by a
single segment starting approximately three nautical miles offshore the land boundary terminus and running until the jurisdiction of a third state. Beyond these apparent similarities, the
starting points, bearings, and legal arguments made in support of these maritime boundary
claims were quite different.
Nicaragua claimed a geography-based boundary starting offshore from the mouth of the
River Coco running on a constant bearing of 52° 45⬘ 21⬙ until it reached the maritime area of
a third state (para. 83). Nicaragua’s line bisected the angle formed by generalized versions of
the parties’ entire coasts from the Nicaraguan border with Costa Rica to the Honduran border
with Guatemala. Additionally, Nicaragua argued that the equidistance method was not feasible
12
The Court reviewed evidence of effectivités in the categories of legislative and administrative control, application and enforcement of criminal and civil law, regulation of immigration, regulation of fisheries activities, naval
patrols, oil concessions, and public works (paras. 176 –208).
13
Quoting Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 46 (Apr. 5).

4

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 102

because of the instability of the coast in the vicinity of the land boundary terminus and the
prominence of Cape Gracias a Dios on this convex coast (para. 84; see para. 277).
Honduras argued that the maritime boundary was already settled by virtue of colonial-era
history and the postcolonial conduct of the parties. The Honduran “traditional line” boundary
started offshore the mouth of the River Coco and ran due east along the parallel of latitude of
the 1962 Point (14°59.8⬘ N, or approximately 15° N) until it reached 82° W and the beginning
of the Honduras-Colombia maritime boundary agreed in 1986. Applying the uti possidetis juris
principle to the delimitation, Honduras argued that maritime jurisdiction near shore was
divided along the 15th parallel at the time of independence and that postcolonial conduct in
oil leasing, fisheries licensing, and naval patrols evidenced a tacit agreement extending the
boundary eastward along the same parallel (paras. 86 – 87). In the alternative, Honduras
argued that the Court could and should use the equidistance method to delimit a boundary
(para. 91).
The Court acknowledged that the uti possidetis juris principle could play a role in maritime
delimitation but rejected Honduras’ uti possidetis argument (paras. 229 –36). Honduras’s tacit
agreement argument also failed (paras. 237–58), leaving the Court to delimit the boundary.
Applying the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) to
the coastal geography of the parties (paras. 268 –70), the Court employed three geometric
methods to delimit the boundary: the angle bisector method for the lateral boundary between
the adjacent mainland coasts, and the 12-nautical-mile arc and equidistance methods to
delimit around and between the opposite-facing offshore islands. As the Court wrote, “the
equidistance method does not automatically have priority over other methods of delimitation
and, in particular circumstances, there may be factors which make the application of the equidistance method inappropriate” (para. 272). The Court found a number of factors, including
the instability and prominence of Cape Gracias a Dios, that made the equidistance method
inappropriate for the purpose of delimiting a single maritime boundary (paras. 277– 80).
These geomorphological problems near the land boundary terminus constituted a special circumstance “in which it cannot apply the equidistance principle” (para. 281), triggering the
exception to equidistance (in the territorial sea) provided by Article 15 of the LOS Convention.
To delimit the lateral boundary, the Court turned to the angle bisector method. Like equidistance, the angle bisector method is based on coastal geography. A bisector is “the line formed
by bisecting the angle created by the linear approximations of coastlines” (para. 287). Unlike
equidistance, which responds to only the most prominent microgeographic features, the angle
bisector method generalizes irregular coastal features. The Court’s linear approximations of the
“relevant coasts” (para. 289) hinged at the 1962 Point and ran northwest to Honduras’s Punta
Patuca Lighthouse and south to Nicaragua’s Wouhnta (para. 298).14 The bisector of the angle
formed by these lines ran from the 1962 Point on a constant bearing of 70°14⬘ 41.25⬙ and
formed the backbone of the Court’s delimitation (id.).
14
The Court acknowledged that the process of “[i]dentifying the relevant coastal geography calls for the exercise
of judgment in assessing the actual coastal geography” (para. 289). The Court considered whether the relevant coasts
faced the disputed area, whether the relevant coasts were long enough to “account properly for the coastal configuration in the disputed area,” and whether the linear approximation of the relevant coast would cut off significant
portions of territory, thereby depriving them of effect on the delimitation (paras. 295–98).
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The Court’s bisector, which bisected only the relevant parts of the mainland coasts, taking
no account of offshore islands, ran to the north of the Honduran islands, thereby placing them
on Nicaragua’s side of the bisector. The Court’s solution is shown in the inset in Figure 1; it
created a Honduran semi-enclave to the south of the bisector consisting of the arcs of the territorial sea limits of Bobel Cay (arc A-B) and South Cay (arc E-F) joined by the multisegment
equidistance line between Nicaragua’s Edinburgh Cay and Honduras’s Bobel, Port Royal, and
South Cays (line B-C-D-E) (para. 305).15 Although the Court’s bisector used the 1962 Point
as the vertex of its angle, the Court started its boundary, as previously noted, at a point on the
bisector line three nautical miles seaward of the 1962 Point.
The eastern end of the delimitation was also problematic because of the potential maritime
interests of Colombia and Jamaica in that area.16 After considering the possible interests manifested by Colombia’s apparent boundary claim against Nicaragua, its negotiated boundary
with Honduras, and its joint-regime area agreement with Jamaica, the Court concluded that
15

Judge Koroma, in his separate opinion, and Judge ad hoc Gaja, in his declaration, both noted that in the area
between the opposite-facing islands, Honduras was awarded a maritime area south of 14° 59.8⬘ N that it did not
claim. Such awards are unusual in maritime boundary delimitations.
16
The territories of Jamaica, to the northeast, and Colombia, to the southeast, are within 400 nautical miles of
Honduras and Nicaragua, which suggests potentially overlapping claims. During the proceedings, both Colombia
and Jamaica requested and were granted copies of the pleadings and annexes (para. 9). Also, two bilateral maritime
delimitations were previously concluded in the vicinity of this delimitation: the 1986 Colombia-Honduras maritime boundary and the 1993 Colombia-Jamaica joint regime area.
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its delimitation would not affect Colombia’s interests (paras. 315–18).17 While the Court did
not specify an eastern endpoint, it did indicate that the boundary extends along the bisector
line “until it reaches the area where the rights of third States may be affected” (para. 321).18
****
With this judgment the Court moved away from the two-step process that it has used to
delimit maritime boundaries over the past two decades. In following that process, the Court
first draws a provisional equidistance line and then considers whether circumstances require
that the line be adjusted in order to achieve an equitable result.19 In the instant case the Court
revived the angle bisector delimitation method, which it had not used since the mid-1980s.20
Even though it was forced to do so by an unusually difficult geographical situation at the land
boundary terminus, the Court’s use of the angle bisector method is significant.21 This decision
might allow more flexibility in the choice of method in future delimitations.22
The use of the angle bisector method had a secondary impact with respect to the analysis of
the effect of islands, rocks, and low-tide elevations on the delimitation. In applying the twostep equidistance process, the Court and other boundary tribunals have given full effect to the
base points on all features, regardless of size, in the first step of the analysis: the construction
of the provisional equidistance line.23 In the second step of the analysis, the effect of these features on the equidistance line has then been discounted, either partially or fully, if necessary,
to achieve an equitable result. Often, the Court explains the reason for discounting a particular
feature. In contrast, the macrogeographic angle bisector method presumes a mainland-tomainland delimitation. Here, the chosen method led the Court to treat the offshore features
17
Jamaica did not get as much consideration from the Court as Colombia. It should be noted that an endpoint
located at the easternmost extreme of the Court’s bisector line would be well within 200 nautical miles of Jamaica.
18
The Court did provide a range within which this endpoint might ultimately be located: between 82° W and
“200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured” (para. 319).
19
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.; Eq. Guinea intervening),
2002 ICJ REP. 303, para. 288 (Oct. 10) (reported by Peter H. F. Bekker at 97 AJIL 387 (2003)); see also Continental
Shelf (Libya/Malta), 1985 ICJ REP. 13 ( June 3); Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan
Mayen (Den. v. Nor.), 1993 ICJ REP. 38 ( June 14); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between
Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahr.), 2001 ICJ REP. 40 (Mar. 16). Other maritime boundary tribunals have followed
this same approach. See Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (UK/Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 3 (1977), 18 ILM 397 (1979);
Maritime Delimitation, Phase II (Eri./Yemen) (Arb. Trib. Dec. 17, 1999), at ⬍http://www.pca-cpa.org⬎, 40 ILM
900 (2001) (reported by W. Michael Reisman at 94 AJIL 721 (2000)); Award, Jurisdiction and Merits (Barb./Trin.
& Tobago) (UN Law of the Sea Annex VII Arb. Trib. Apr. 11, 2006), at ⬍http://www.pca-cpa.org⬎, 45 ILM 800
(2006) (reported by Barbara Kwiatkowska at 101 AJIL 149 (2006)); Award, Jurisdiction and Merits (Guy./Surin.)
(UN Law of the Sea Annex VII Arb. Trib. Sept. 17, 2007), at ⬍http://www.pca-cpa.org⬎ (reported by Stephen
Fietta in this issue of the Journal).
20
See Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 ICJ REP. 18 (Feb. 24); Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.), 1984 ICJ REP. 246 ( Jan. 20).
21
It could be argued that the Court’s resort to the angle bisector method was not such a large step. After all, an
angle bisector is essentially a simplified equidistance line, or an equidistance line drawn using simplified coasts. Both
are distance-based methods grounded in coastal geography. The Court itself mentions that the bisector method
provides, in certain circumstances, an “approximation” of the equidistance method (para. 287).
22
In a delimitation award rendered only weeks before the instant judgment, the tribunal in the Guyana/Suriname arbitration rejected the use of the angle bisector method in that particular situation. Guyana/Suriname, para.
372 (UN Law of the Sea Annex VII Arb. Trib. Sept. 17, 2007), at ⬍http://www.pca-cpa.org⬎ (reported by Stephen
Fietta in this issue of the Journal).
23
See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain; Maritime Delimination, Phase II (Eri./Yemen).
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as an afterthought, enclaving them after the mainland-to-mainland boundary had been decided.24
In addition to the geomorphological problems at the starting point of this boundary, the
Court was keenly aware that its decision would potentially affect the interests of third states at
the delimitation’s eastern end—specifically, Colombia and Jamaica. Throughout the present
proceedings, the Court would have been mindful of the case that Nicaragua brought against
Colombia in December 2001. In that case, Nicaragua requested the Court to decide sovereignty over numerous insular features and to delimit a mainland-to-mainland equidistance line
between the opposite coasts of the two states.25 Among the features claimed by both Nicaragua
and Colombia are those on Serranilla Bank (located within the Colombia-Jamaica joint regime
area) and the features on Quitasueño and Serrana Banks, south of Colombia’s 1986 boundary
with Honduras. In dealing with the question of third-state interests, the Court “indicate[d]
that the alleged third-State rights said to exist east of the 82nd meridian do not lie in the area
being delimited and thus present no obstacle to deciding that the line continues beyond that
meridian” (paras. 314, 319). On its face, the Court’s decision appears to complicate the boundary relationship between Honduras and Colombia by establishing an area of Nicaraguan jurisdiction north of some part of the 1986 Colombia-Honduras boundary (para. 315). Jurisdiction in the area east of 82° W is still largely undecided, but the boundary relationships in this
region should be clearer after the Court determines the merits of the territorial and maritime
dispute between Nicaragua and Colombia.
COALTER G. LATHROP
Sovereign Geographic, Inc.
24
The Court hints that the islands received this treatment because “as regards the islands in dispute no claim has
been made by either Party for maritime areas other than the territorial sea” (para. 262).
25
On December 13, 2007, the Court ruled on Colombia’s preliminary objections, see Territorial and Maritime
Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Preliminary Objections, para. 12, finding that it had jurisdiction to rule on the maritime delimitation and on the sovereignty dispute over all features except the islands of Providencia, San Andrés,
and Santa Catalina.

